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Rethinking the After-Acquired Evidence
Defense in Title VII Disparate
Treatment Cases
by
RicHAiR G. STEELE*
Introduction
If an employee deliberately falsifies an employment application
or engages in on-the-job misconduct that, if known by the employer,
would subject the employee to immediate discharge, should the em-
ployee be permitted to recover in a subsequent lawsuit alleging job
discrimination? With increasing frequency, employers are defending
discrimination suits' by alleging r6sum6 fraud or employee miscon-
duct2 discovered after an allegedly discriminatory employment deci-
sion. Discord among the federal circuits regarding the proper
treatment of the "after-acquired evidence ' 3 has produced inconsistent
results at the district court level, both within those circuits that have
* J.D. Candidate, 1995; B.A. University of California, San Diego, 1991.
1. Although the majority of cases discussed in this Note involve disparate treatment
claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,78 Stat.
253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)
[hereinafter Title VII], the principles discussed herein are generally applicable to other
federal antidiscrimination laws. See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., tit. II, at 4
(1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 696-97 ("A number of other laws banning dis-
crimination ... are modeled after, and have been interpreted in a manner consistent with,
Title VII."). Specifically, Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on sex,
race, color, religion, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988). "Disparate treat-
ment" has been defined by the Supreme Court as a situation in which "[tjhe employer
simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
335 n.15 (1977).
2. The terms "employee misconduct" or "misconduct" as used in this Note refer to
any behavior on the part of the employee that provides the employer with legitimate
grounds for termination. See, e.g., Paglio v. Chagrin Valley Hunt Club Corp., No. 91-3983,
1992 WL 144674 (6th Cir. June 25, 1992) (misappropriation of employer funds for personal
use); Bonger v. American Water Works, 789 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1992) (removal of
employer's confidential files); Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700
(10th Cir. 1988) (falsification of company records).
3. The Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have ad-
dressed the after-acquired evidence problem with conflicting results. See discussion infra
Part II.
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not yet addressed the issue4 and in some instances even within those
that have.5 Although the Supreme Court has already indicated its
willingness to resolve this rift,6 the after-acquired evidence debate
continues to divide the courts.
The majority of federal courts that have addressed this problem
have sided with employers, holding that evidence of employee mis-
conduct or deceit discovered subsequent to the challenged employ-
ment decision bars any recovery by the employee.7 The majority view
argues that although evidence discovered after termination is not rele-
vant in determining the cause of the employee's discharge, it does de-
feat the injury claim, and thus precludes any relief.8 Accordingly, an
employer who is able to demonstrate that the employee would not
have been hired, or would have been immediately terminated had the
information been known, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 9
This approach prevents a person from fraudulently obtaining employ-
4. Within the Ninth Circuit, for instance, compare O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas
Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Ariz. 1992) (granting summary judgment to em-
ployer) with Benitez v. Portland Gen. Elec., No. CV 91-864-PA, 1992 WL 278104, at *7 (D.
Or. Mar. 31, 1992) (declining to grant employer's summary judgment motion "[i]n view of
the absence of Ninth Circuit precedent, and the harshness of the result urged by
defendant").
5. Compare Benson v. Quanex Corp., No. 90-CV-71996-DT, 1992 WL 63013 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 24, 1992) (barring recovery under Michigan Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act be-
cause of after-acquired evidence of employment application fraud ) with Bazzi v. Western
& S. Life Ins. Co., 808 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (allowing recovery of damages
under Elliot-Larsen Act despite after-acquired evidence of employment application fraud),
rev'd, 25 F.3d 1047 (6th Cir. 1994) (table). Before either of these cases was decided, the
Sixth Circuit had already ruled that the after-acquired evidence doctrine was applicable to
claims brought under Elliot-Larsen. Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409
(6th Cir. 1992).
6. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in a Sixth Circuit case but later dismissed
the appeal at the request of the parties. Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological Univ.,
975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2991, and cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 22
(1993). Recently, however, the Justices agreed to review another Sixth Circuit panel deci-
sion involving the after-acquired evidence defense. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub-
lishing Co., 9 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 2099 (1994).
7. See, e.g., McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 539 (6th Cir.
1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 2099 (1994); Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864
F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988); Rich v. Westland Printers, Inc., No. Civ. A. HAR 92-2475, 1993
WL 220453 (D. Md. June 9, 1993); Churchman v. Pinkerton's Inc., 756 F. Supp. 515 (D.
Kan. 1991). Indeed, because the post-termination discovery of rdsum6 fraud or employee
misconduct is often so favorable to the employer, one commentary has suggested that ob-
taining material after-acquired evidence is "akin to winning the lottery." William S. Waldo
& Rosemary A. Mahar, Lost Cause and Found Defense: Using Evidence Discovered After
an Employee's Discharge to Bar Discrimination Claims, 9 LAB. L.J. 31, 32 n.1 (1993).
8. Summers, 864 F.2d at 708.
9. Milligan-Jensen, 975 F.2d at 304-05.
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ment or engaging in misconduct worthy of discharge and later claim-
ing injury as an "employee."'10
However, a growing number of courts have forged a separate
path and have rejected the use of after-acquired evidence of rrsum6
fraud or employee misconduct to entirely preclude a plaintiff's right to
relief.11 This approach assumes that withholding all remedies from an
aggrieved employee for reasons completely unrelated to the em-
ployer's discriminatory conduct is antithetical to the stated goals of
the antidiscrimination laws. 12 This practice ignores the fact that "em-
ployees subjected to discriminatory discharge have indeed suffered an
injury regardless of whether other legitimate reasons for discharge
might have existed. ' 13 Rather than treating after-acquired evidence
as a complete bar to recovery, the minority view considers the evi-
dence only as a limitation on a successful plaintiff's remedies of rein-
statement, promotion, hiring, or front pay.' 4
Both approaches to the after-acquired evidence problem possess
some merit, yet neither solution effectively balances the interests at
stake. On one hand, the majority approach is correct in asserting that
no compensation should result from the deprivation of a job to which
10. See, e.g., Dotson v. United States Postal Serv., 977 F.2d 976, 978 (6th Cir. 1992)
(per curiam) (holding that plaintiff was "not entitled to ... relief when he was not initially
qualified for the position"), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 263 (1992). See infra Part II.A. for a
discussion of the majority view.
11. The first major case to do so was Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th
Cir. 1992), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, No. 91-7406,1994 WL 481439 (11th Cir. Sept.
6, 1994). More recently, the Third Circuit also rejected the use of after-acquired evidence
to completely preclude relief in discrimination cases. Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co.,
31 F.3d 1221 (3d Cir. 1994).
12. Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1180-81. See also Jennifer Miyoko Follette, Comment, Com-
plete Justice: Upholding the Principles of Title VII Through Appropriate Treatment of Af-
ter-Acquired Evidence, 68 WASH. L. REv. 651 (1993) (arguing that the use of after-
acquired evidence as a complete defense under Title VII undermines the purpose of the
statute).
13. Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F. Supp. 314, 323 (D.N.J. 1993)
(rejecting after-acquired evidence as a complete bar to recovery).
14. In addition, some courts allow after-acquired evidence of employee misconduct or
rdsum6 fraud to partially limit a successful plaintiff's award of back pay. See, e.g., Kristufek
v. Hussman Foodservice Co., 985 F.2d 364,371 (7th Cir. 1993) (limiting back pay award to
the period between the date of plaintiff's discharge and the date the evidence was discov-
ered). Most courts adhering to the minority view give no effect to after-acquired evidence
when calculating a back pay award. See, e.g., Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1182 (holding that back
pay will be reduced only if the employer can demonstrate that, independent of the plain-
tiff's lawsuit, it would have discovered the information prior to the date of judgment). For
an overview of the Wallace court's approach to the remedies issue, see Elizabeth Pryor
Johnson, After-Acquired Evidence of Employee Misconduct: Affirmative Defense or Limi-
tation on Remedies?, 67 FLA. B. J. 76 (1993). See infra Part II.B. for a general discussion of
the minority approach.
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the employee was not initially entitled.15 However, courts following
the minority view are equally correct in holding that employees who
are discharged for discriminatory reasons have suffered legal harm
from the disparate treatment, and deserve compensation for that in-
jury.16 A more sensible approach to the after-acquired evidence prob-
lem should occupy a middle ground between these two competing
doctrines. Consistent with the majority approach, an employee who is
guilty of on-the-job misconduct or r6sum6 fraud should be denied the
full spectrum of relief and should not recover job-related economic
damages. However, it is inconsistent with the goals of the federal an-
tidiscrimination laws to allow after-acquired evidence of an em-
ployee's wrongdoing to prevent that employee from proving at trial
that the employer's decision was motivated by unlawful considera-
tions. An employee who proves discrimination should not be barred
from obtaining a remedy tailored to compensate for the harm caused
by the employer's illegal discrimination. This Note focuses on the pre-
cise nature of the employee's remedy in this context.
In passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991,17 Congress amended Title
VII to impose liability on employers whenever discrimination plays a
role in an employment decision, even though legitimate reasons may
have also motivated the employer's decision. 18 This statutory provi-
sion for employer liability in these so called "mixed-motive" cases was
intended to strengthen the already existing safeguards against inten-
tional discrimination in employment practices. 19 However, Congress
undercut these same safeguards by placing severe limitations on a
plaintiff's recovery in situations in which an employer is able to
demonstrate that it would have taken the same action in the absence
of any discrimination. 20 More specifically, the new Title VII relief
provisions provide for declaratory and injunctive relief as well as at-
torney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs in mixed-motive cases. These
same plaintiffs may not, however, receive compensatory or punitive
damages, back pay, or an order compelling reinstatement, hiring or
15. Redd v. Fisher Controls, 814 F. Supp. 547, 551 (W.D. Tex. 1992) (holding that
summary judgment is proper "on the grounds that the employee/plaintiff could not have
been injured by being discharged").
16. Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F. Supp. at 322 ("It is problematic
at best to say that there has been no injury in the face of proven illegal conduct.").
17. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
18. Id. § 107(a), 105 Stat. at 1075 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)
(Supp. IV 1992)).
19. See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., tit. II, at 17 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 710 (holding employers liable in mixed-motive situation reaffirms "Title
VII's twin objectives of deterring employers from discriminatory conduct and redressing
the injuries suffered by victims of discrimination").
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (Supp. III 1991).
[Vol. 46
November 1994] RETHINKING AFIER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE DEFENSE 247
promotion. 21  This newly restructured liability and enforcement
scheme reflects a legislative compromise. While employers are no
longer absolved of liability for their discriminatory decisions on
grounds that an alternative justification exists, the law refuses to grant
an employee the maximum recovery when that employee is otherwise
not entitled to the job.
Because a mixed-motive case looks to the actual motivations of
the employer at the time of the adverse employment decision, the
temporal focus is different in cases involving after-acquired evi-
dence.22 Yet the competing interests are similar in both contexts. The
pivotal inquiry remains: How should an employee's right to be free
from invidious discrimination be balanced against the equitable no-
tion that a dishonest employee is not otherwise deserving of relief?
This Note argues that the basic relief framework created by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 for mixed-motive cases, together with added provi-
sions for compensatory and punitive damages, should be applicable to
cases involving after-acquired evidence. Part I of this Note provides a
brief overview of the mixed-motive defense and discusses the changes
wrought by the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Part II ana-
lyzes the existing approaches to the after-acquired evidence problem
and highlights the principal differences between them. .Part III criti-
cizes the federal courts' treatment of after-acquired evidence, arguing
that both the majority and minority views are too extreme in their
application. Finally, Part IV of the Note sets forth a proposal rooted
in the recent amendments to Title VII which effectively balances the
employee's right to be free from unlawful acts of discrimination
against both the employer's right to insist upon integrity in the work
force and the equitable notion that a dishonest employee should not
receive a windfall.
I. The Mixed-Motive Cases
A mixed-motive case is one in which an employer makes an ad-
verse employment decision for an unlawful reason; such as race or
gender discrimination, and for a legitimate reason not prohibited by
law, such as poor work performance. When an affected employee can
prove that a particular employment decision was motivated by a pro-
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (Supp. III 1991). In disparate treatment cases not
involving mixed-motives, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 expressly 1provides for compensatory
and punitive damages to victorious plaintiffs. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. III 1991). The
unavailability of these damages for victorious mixed-motive plaintiffs is troubling because
it fails to fully compensate a victim who proves discrimination. See Robert Belton, The
Unfinished Agenda of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 45 RUTrrGERS L. REv. 921 (1993).
22. By contrast, after-acquired evidence cases look to what the employer would have
done at some hypothetical point before the adverse employment decision, assuming it had
known of the employee's wrongdoing.
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hibited reason, the defendant employer may rebut the plaintiff's claim
of injury by demonstrating that legitimate factors were also present at
the time the adverse decision was made.23 Unlike cases involving af-
ter-acquired evidence, the mixed-motive defense considers only the
factors that were actually known and relied upon in making the chal-
lenged employment decision.24 However, mixed-motive cases provide
a useful analogy for resolving the after-acquired evidence problem be-
cause both situations involve balancing the right of an employee to be
free from discrimination against other countervailing factors.
Whereas mixed-motive cases seek to preserve the employer's freedom
to base employment decisions on legitimate factors, after-acquired ev-
idence cases must determine the effect of an employee's malfeasance
on his or her right to recover for a discriminatory employment
decision.
A. The Mount Healthy Causation Test
The mixed-motive analysis was first articulated by the Supreme
Court in Mount Healthy City School District Board of Education v.
Doyle.2 5 In Mount Healthy, an untenured school teacher was dis-
charged by the defendant school board for failing to handle profes-
sional matters with sufficient tact.26 Specifically, the teacher disclosed
to a local radio station the contents of a school memorandum regard-
ing the adoption of a new dress code for teachers, which the radio
station subsequently broadcast as a news item.2 7 Additionally, the
teacher made obscene gestures to two female students during an inci-
dent in the school cafeteria.28 Upon learning the reasons for his dis-
charge, the teacher filed suit, claiming that the school board's decision
violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The
district court concluded that the communication to the radio station
was constitutionally protected conduct, and that it played a substantial
role in the school board's decision to discharge the teacher.29 The dis-
23. See, e.g., Fields v. Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931, 936 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that the
burden of showing non-discriminatory motive shifts to employer once plaintiff submits di-
rect evidence of discrimination); Terbovitz v. Fiscal Court, 825 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1987)
(same).
24. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989) (Brennan, J., plurality
opinion) ("An employer may not, in other words, prevail in a mixed-motives case by offer-
ing a legitimate and sufficient reason for its decision if that reason did not motivate it at the
time of the decision.").
25. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
26. Id. at 283 n.1.
27. Id. at 282.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 283.
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trict judge found the constitutional violation to be determinative on
the issue of liability and ordered reinstatement with back pay.30
Although the Supreme Court agreed with the district court that
the teacher's communication to the radio station was protected by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, it reversed on the ground that the
plaintiff could nonetheless have been terminated for making the ob-
scene gestures to the female students.31 The Court disagreed with the
causation test employed by the district judge, observing that a rule
"which focuses solely on whether protected conduct played a part,
'substantial' or otherwise... could place an employee in a better posi-
tion as a result of the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct
than he would have occupied had he done nothing."3 2 The Court an-
nounced a new causation rule for cases involving a mixture of legiti-
mate and illegitimate motives: Where an employee demonstrates that
an adverse employment decision was motivated in part by the em-
ployee's constitutionally protected conduct, the employer may avoid
liability by showing that it would have reached the same decision in
the absence of the protected activity.3 3
B. Price Waterhouse and Title VII Discrimination Cases
Circuit courts were divided on the application of the Mount
Healthy "same decision" test to suits brought under Title VII until the
Supreme Court reviewed the matter in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.3 4
In Price Waterhouse, a senior manager who was denied a promotion to
an accounting partnership sued her employer under Title VII, charg-
30. Id.
31. Id. at 287.
32. Id. at 285. The Court also noted that any constitutional right implicated by the
adverse employment decision is "sufficiently vindicated if [the] employee is placed in no
worse a position than if he had not engaged in the conduct." Id. at 285-86 (emphasis
added).
33. Id. at 287. The case was subsequently remanded to the district court to determine
whether the school board would indeed have terminated plaintiff without regard to the
constitutionally protected conduct. Id. On remand, the district court concluded that the
teacher would have been rightfully terminated for reasons independent of the radio com-
munication. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 670 F.2d 59 (6th Cir. 1982).
34. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). Before Price Waterhouse, the circuit courts disagreed over
the level of proof required of an employer to show that it would have made the same
decision in the absence of a discriminatory animus. Compare Fields v. Clark Univ., 817
F.2d 931, 937 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[W]e think the test usually applied in civil cases - prepon-
derance of the evidence - is the appropriate one.") with Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083,
1085 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (requiring clear and convincing evidence). An additional conflict
existed with respect to the impact of a properly proven mixed-motive defense - specifi-
cally, whether the defense absolved the employer of liability, or whether it merely limited
the employee's available remedy. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 238 n.2.
ing gender discrimination.35 The district court concluded that
although the employer had legitimate non discriminatory reasons for
denying the promotion, the decision was at least partially motivated
by the employer's impermissible conceptions about the proper behav-
ior of women.36 On review, the Supreme Court held that when a
plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that gender 37 played a role in an
adverse employment decision, the burden of persuasion shifts to the
employer to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would
have made the same decision irrespective of the proven discrimina-
tion.38 By allowing an employer to avoid liability upon satisfying this
burden,39 Price Waterhouse extended the Mount Healthy "same deci-
sion" test and its corresponding evidentiary scheme to cases brought
under the federal antidiscrimination statutes.40
The Supreme Court explained its adoption of the Mount Healthy
rule by pointing to Title VII's goal of preserving the balance between
"employee rights and employer prerogatives."'41 The Court observed
that although Title VII was intended to eradicate all invidious consid-
eration of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in employment
practices, the statute did not purport to impinge on an employer's
freedom of choice to insist that employees possess the necessary quali-
fications for employment. 42 According to the Court, the balance of
employee and employer rights is best served by a rule that allows an
employer to avoid liability upon a showing that it would have made
the same decision in the absence of a discriminatory animus.43 Im-
plicit in the Court's reasoning is the idea that allowing an employee to
recover despite evidence of other legitimate factors supporting the de-
cision unfairly tips the scales in the employee's favor.44
35. 490 U.S. at 232.
36. Id. at 236-37.
37. Although Price Waterhouse dealt specifically with gender-based discrimination, its
reasoning applies with equal force to claims of discrimination based on race, color, religion
or national origin. Indeed, the Court noted that Title VII "treats each of the enumerated
categories exactly the same." Id. at 243-44 n.9.
38. Id. at 244-45.
39. Justice Brennan characterized the employer's burden in mixed-motive cases as an
affirmative defense because "the plaintiff must persuade the factfinder on one point, and
then the employer, if it wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another." Id. at 246 (citing
NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 400 (1983)).
40. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S at 247 n.12.
41. Id. at 239.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 242 ("We conclude that the preservation of this freedom means that an
employer shall not be liable if it can prove that, even if it had not taken gender into ac-
count, it would have come to the same decision regarding a particular person.").
44. This is consistent with the Court's pronouncement in Mount Healthy that any right
of the employee is "sufficiently vindicated if [the] employee is placed in no worse a posi-
tion than if he had not engaged in the conduct." Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
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C. The Congressional Response: Redefining the-Balance
In direct response to the Supreme Court's decision in Price
Waterhouse, the Civil Rights Act of 199145 amended Title VII to im-
pose liability on employers whenever an impermissible factor contrib-
utes to an employment decision.46 Believing that Price Waterhouse
"severely undermine[d] protections against intentional employment
discrimination," 47 Congress passed legislation eliminating an em-
ployer's ability to evade punishment for discriminatory employment
decisions simply by articulating an alternate nondiscriminatory reason
that also contributed to the decision. Section 107(a) of the 1991 Act
provides that "an unlawful employment practice is established when
the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice,
even though other factors also motivated the practice."4 The relief
provisions of the statute are now triggered once the aggrieved party
proves the existence of any forbidden motive.
Although section 107(a) reflects a congressional purpose to bring
all incidents of employment discrimination on the basis of race, sex,
color, religion, or national origin under the protective wing of Title
VII, Congress nevertheless believed that "a complaining party
[should] receive relief only for the harm that actually results from the
illegal discriminatory conduct. ' 49 Accordingly, under the 1991 Act,
when an employer is able to establish that it would have reached the
same adverse employment decision without regard to any impermissi-
ble criteria, the affected employee may not receive compensatory or
punitive damages, back pay, or any prospective relief (including court-
ordered hiring, reinstatement, or promotion).50 By curtailing a suc-
cessful plaintiff's award in a mixed-motive case, the 1991 Act attempts
to redress only the injury actually attributable to the discrimination.
That is, a remedy is provided for all intentional acts of discrimination,
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,285-86 (1977). Disregarding the additional legitimate reasons
underlying the challenged employment decision not only curtails the employer's preroga-
tives, but arguably places the employee in a better position than if no discrimination oc-
curred, since the adverse decision would have been made even in the absence of any
discrimination. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
45. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter the 1991 Act].
46. § 107(a), 105 Stat. at 1075 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp.
IV 1992)).
47. H.R. REP,. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., tit. II, at 18 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 711.
48. § 107(a), 105 Stat. at 1075 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp.
IV 1992) (emphasis added).
49. H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., tit. II, at 19 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 712.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii) (Supp. III 1991).
yet employees who would have been in the same adverse position in
the absence of the discriminatory act cannot obtain a litigation wind-
fall. The court may, however, order "other appropriate relief, includ-
ing injunctive or declaratory relief" and attorney's fees for pursuing
the claim.51
In creating this new liability and relief framework for mixed-mo-
tive cases, Congress redefined the balance between "employee rights
and employer prerogatives." 52  Whereas the Court in Price
Waterhouse held that these two considerations were adequately bal-
anced by the Mount Healthy "same decision" test,53 Congress believed
that the Mount Healthy framework was inadequate to safeguard a per-
son's right to be free from discrimination in their employment. Con-
gress instead elected to hold employers liable for all discriminatory
employment decisions, whether or not legitimate motives were also
present.5 4 At the same time, however, the 1991 Act was intended to
preserve an employer's remaining freedom of choice in making em-
ployment decisions by precluding mixed-motive plaintiffs from attain-
ing job-related remedies. By striking what was perceived to be a more
satisfactory balance between employee rights and employer preroga-
tives, these statutory changes were designed to uphold "Title VII's
twin objectives of deterring employers from discriminatory conduct
and redressing the injuries suffered by victims of discrimination. '55
The new relief framework applicable to mixed-motive cases necessar-
ily assumes that an employer will be sufficiently deterred from engag-
ing in discriminatory employment practices by the specter of costly
litigation and the resulting stigma should the plaintiff prevail. As to
the second of Title VII's purposes, this enforcement scheme reflects a
congressional policy decision that declaratory relief, injunctive relief
(other than reinstatement, hiring, or promotion) and attorney's fees
are sufficient to redress the injuries of plaintiffs who would have been
in the same adverse position regardless of proven discrimination.5 6
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. IlI 1991); H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess., tit. I, at 49 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 587. The Supreme Court
recently held that the provisions of the 1991 Act, including the new relief provisions, are
not retroactively applicable. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods. 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994) (find-
ing the 1991 Act inapplicable to case pending on appeal when statute was passed).
52. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989).
53. See supra text accompanying note 33.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. IV 1992).
55. H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., tit. II, at 17 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 710.
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. III 1991). By enacting this provision,
Congress appears to adopt the position taken by the Justice Department in Price
Waterhouse. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 24, Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (No. 87-1167) (arguing that Title VII "should be construed to
allow the defendant in a disparate treatment case to prove that, because the adverse em-
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I. The After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine in Federal Court
Unlike mixed-motive cases, which involve the presence of both
lawful and unlawful factors at the time of a challenged employment
decision, after-acquired evidence cases address the effect of subse-
quently discovered information that presents an employer with a legit-
imate excuse for its adverse decision, post facto. To illustrate, suppose
that a job applicant falsifies data on an employment application, mis-
represents his or her qualifications on a r6sum6, or, after being hired,
engages in misconduct that would justify immediate termination. Im-
agine also that the employer is unaware of this behavior until after it
either refuses to hire or terminates the applicant or employee for al-
leged discriminatory reasons.5 7 Should the employer be permitted to
contest a discrimination claim on the ground that the applicant or em-
ployee has suffered no injury because he or she was not legally enti-
tled to the job at the time the adverse decision was made? The circuit
courts differ on this question: Those courts that have addressed the
issue ally themselves with one of two primary positions. One ap-
proach, followed by the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits,
holds that after-acquired evidence, provided that it is material, oper-
ates as a complete bar to relief.58 The other approach, followed by the
Third, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, does not allow after-acquired
evidence to serve as a complete defense. Rather, these courts permit
the evidence to function only as a partial limitation on a successful
plaintiff's available remedies.59
ployment decision would have been made in any event for legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons, the plaintiff will be made whole by an award of attorney's fees and an injunction
against future discrimination").
57. As this illustration suggests, there are three types of after-acquired evidence cases:
(1) wrongful discharge suits involving post-hiring misconduct; (2) wrongful discharge suits
involving pre-hiring misconduct, including r6sum6 and application fraud; and (3) wrongful
refusal to hire suits involving pre-hiring misconduct. See Gian Brown, Employee Miscon-
duct and the Affirmative Defense of "After-Acquired Evidence," 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 381,
382 (1993).
58. See, e.g., Welch v. Liberty Mach. Works, Inc., 23 F.3d 1403 (8th Cir. 1994); Mc-
Kennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 9 F3d 539 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S.
Ct. 2099 (1994); Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988);
Smallwood v. United Air Lines, 728 F.2d 614 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984).
59. See, e.g., Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221 (3d Cir. 1994); Kris-
tufek v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., 985 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993); Wallace v. Dunn Constr.
Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, No. 91-7406, 1994
WL 481439 (11th Cir. Sept. 6, 1994). The panel decision in Wallace pioneered the minority
approach. Although the Eleventh Circuit has since decided to reconsider the case en banc,
the panel decision in Wallace is perhaps the best illustration of the reasoning behind this
approach.
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A. The Majority View: After-Acquired Evidence as a Complete Defense
The majority of courts that have confronted the after-acquired
evidence dilemma find that such evidence negates the plaintiffs claim.
With certain qualifications, these courts allow an employer to escape
liability completely by showing that the employer either would not
have hired or would have immediately fired the plaintiff had the evi-
dence been known.60 This approach recognizes that although after-
acquired evidence is not probative of an employer's liability, it is rele-
vant to the question of whether the plaintiff actually suffered an injury
from the claimed violation.6' Indeed, courts invoking the after-ac-
quired evidence doctrine assume that an employer is liable and in-
stead focus on the nature of the alleged injury.62 Where no
redressable injury exists because the plaintiffs misconduct preceded
the adverse employment decision, the employer may obtain summary
judgment regardless of whether it engaged in a discriminatory em-
ployment practice.63
(1) Tenth Circuit: Birth of the Doctrine
The genesis of the after-acquired evidence doctrine can be traced
to the landmark case of Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company.64 In Summers, the plaintiff, a claims representa-
tive for the defendant insurance company, filed suit against his em-
ployer alleging that he was unlawfully terminated because of his age
and religion. 65 During pre-trial preparations, almost four years after
the plaintiffs discharge, the defendants discovered that the plaintiff
had falsified company records on over 150 occasions.66 Based on this
newly discovered evidence, the defendant filed a motion for summary
judgment, asserting that, had it previously known of these falsifica-
60. There is some debate as to whether the "would not have hired" standard is appli-
cable in wrongful discharge cases. See infra notes 80-86, 174-183 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 539 (6th Cir.
1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 2099 (1994).
62. O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466, 1469 (D. Ariz.
1992) ("[L]iability of [the defendant] is not at issue. The after-acquired evidence ... is
relevant in determining whether [plaintiff] was injured by the assumed discrimination and
is subject to a summary judgment motion."). When it is undisputed that the defendant
employer would have made the same adverse decision if had it known of the after-acquired
evidence, "it becomes irrelevant whether or not [the employee] was discriminated against."
Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological Univ., 975 F.2d 302, 305 (6th Cir. 1992), cert.
granted, 113 S. Ct. 2991, and cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 22 (1993).
63. See Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409, 415 (6th Cir. 1992) (hold-
ing that the after-acquired evidence entitles employer to summary judgment, even if the
plaintiff can prove a violation of state civil rights statute).
64. 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
65. Id. at 702.
66. Id. at 703.
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tions, it would have immediately terminated the plaintiff.67 Plaintiff's
counsel argued that the evidence of misconduct was inadmissible be-
cause it was irrelevant to the claim of discrimination, and that, accord-
ingly, the court should not consider the evidence in determining the
availability of relief to the plaintiff.68 The district court disagreed with
the plaintiff's argument and granted the defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed 69 the'district court's grant
of summary judgment, noting that "while such after-acquired evidence
cannot be said to have been a 'cause' for Summers' discharge in 1982,
it is relevant to Summers' claim of 'injury,' and does itself preclude the
grant of any present relief or remedy .... ,,70 Relying on the causation
rule enunciated in Mount Healthy,71 the Summers court concluded
that even if the plaintiff's discharge was predicated upon impermissi-
ble considerations, he suffered no harm because the defendant could
have taken the same action in the absence of any discrimination and
would have terminated the plaintiff had it known of his misconduct:
The present case is akin to the hypothetical wherein a company doc-
tor is fired because of his age, race,. religion, and sex and the com-
pany, in defending a civil rights action, thereafter discovers that the
discharged employee was not a "doctor." In our view, the masquer-
ading doctor would be entitled to no relief, and Summers is in no
better a position.72
This reasoning makes clear that an employer's motivation in reaching
an adverse employment decision is irrelevant to the summary judg-
ment calculus; the employer's motion is granted not because it is able
to articulate a nondiscriminatory, legitimate business reason for its
act, but rather because the plaintiff has not been injured by the ad-
verse decision.73
a. Pre-Hiring Misconduct
In O'Driscoll v. Hercules Inc.,74 the Tenth Circuit applied the
Summers rule to a case involving pre-hiring misconduct. In
O'Driscoll, the plaintiff sued her employer for age discrimination after
being discharged from her job as a quality control. inspector. During
preparation for trial the employer discovered that the plaintiff had
67. Id. at 708.
68. Id. at 704.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 708.
71. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
72. Summers, 864 F.2d at 708.
73. Id.
74. 12 F.3d 176 (10th Cir.), petition for cert filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3757 (U.S. Apr. 1,1994)
(No. 93-1728).
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made several misrepresentations on her employment application
forms. Specifically, on her employment application, the plaintiff un-
derstated her age by five years, falsely represented that she had never
previously applied for a job with the defendant, and failed to disclose
a previous employer.75 The defendant also discovered that the plain-
tiff had misrepresented the age of her son in order to obtain depen-
dent health care coverage for him through her employer's health
plan.76 The O'Driscoll court affirmed the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that the after-ac-
quired evidence of the plaintiffs misconduct precluded her from
obtaining any relief due to her termination.77 The court noted that
under the rule established in Summers, three factors must coalesce in
order for after-acquired evidence to bar relief in a wrongful discharge
case: (1) the employer must have been unaware of the misconduct
when the employee was discharged; (2) the misconduct must justify
discharge; and (3) the employer must demonstrate that it would have
discharged the employee had it known of the misconduct. 78 The court
expressly rejected the plaintiffs argument that employee misconduct
must be "serious and pervasive" for Summers to apply.79 Although
the seriousness and pervasiveness of the plaintiff's misconduct re-
mains a factor under the second and third prongs of the Summers test,
it is not a threshold requirement for application of the rule itself.
b. "Would Not Have Hired" and "Would Have Fired" Standards
Because the defendant in O'Driscoll successfully demonstrated
that it would have discharged the plaintiff had it known of her miscon-
duct, the court reserved judgment on the defendant's alternative argu-
ment that it also would not have hired the plaintiff had it known of the
after-acquired evidence.80 In light of O'Driscoll's limited holding, and
bearing in mind that Summers was a case involving only post-hiring
misconduct, the issue of whether the "would not have hired" standard
applies in a wrongful discharge suit has never been addressed by the
Tenth Circuit. District courts within the Tenth Circuit are divided on
the issue and seem to apply both the "would not have hired" and the
75. Id. at 177-78.
76. Id. at 178. Plaintiff also falsely represented that she had completed two quarters
of study at a technical college and misrepresented her age, under penalty of law, on an
official United States Government application form for access to confidential information.
Id.
77. Id. at 180-81.
78. Id. at 179 (citing Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 708
(10th Cir. 1988)).
79. Id. at 179.
80. Id. at 181 n.3.
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"would have fired" standards interchangeably without discussion.8' In
Bonger v. American Water Works,82 the only case within the Tenth
Circuit to actually discuss the issue of which standard would apply, the
court noted that in wrongful discharge cases involving after-acquired
evidence of pre-hiring misconduct, the "would not have hired" stan-
dard might be inapplicable.8 Although the Bonger court concluded
that the defendant employer would indeed have terminated the em-
ployee had it known of the pre-hiring misconduct, Judge Carrigan
noted that this might not always be the case: "There are many situa-
tions, however, in which an employer would not discharge an em-
ployee if it subsequently discovered r6sum6 fraud, although the
employee would not have been hired absent that r6sum6 fraud. In
such situations, the employee indeed would suffer injury if discharged
because of discrimination."' 4 Specifically, if an employee has consist-
ently performed outstanding work, or if the employer had invested a
great deal of time training the employee, or if the circumstances sur-
rounding the actual misrepresentation are particularly understanda-
ble, an employer may be hesitant to discharge the employee.85
Although this question has yet to be resolved by the Tenth Circuit, the
Bonger court's reasoning is persuasive and has been cited approvingly
by other courts.86
81. See, e.g., Van Deursen v. United States Tobacco Sales & Mktg. Co., 839 F. Supp.
760 (D. Colo. 1993) (granting summary judgment on both "would not have hired" and
"would have fired" standards); DeVoe v. Medi-Dyn, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 546 (D. Kan. 1992)
(denying employer's motion based on "would not have hired standard"); Bonger v. Ameri-
can Water Works, 789 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1992) (rejecting "would not have hired"
standard); Churchman v. Pinkerton's Inc., 756 F. Supp. 515 (D. Kan. 1991) (granting sum-
mary judgment on both standards).
The focus of the after-acquired evidence inquiry is obviously different in a wrongful
refusal-to-hire case. Because the plaintiff in such a case was never hired, the "would have
fired" standard has no application. Thus, in application-rejection cases, the "would not
have hired" standard is the only meaningful benchmark. Although the Tenth Circuit has
never specifically addressed the relevance of Summers to suits involving application-rejec-
tion, it has indicated that similar results would be obtained in both wrongful discharge and
wrongful refusal-to-hire cases. See Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d at
707 n.3 ("[W]e find no meaningful distinction between a case involving the rejection of an
application and a case involving the discharge of an employee."). One district court within
the Tenth Circuit has explicitly undertaken this extension of the rule and applied Summers
to an application-rejection case. Punahele v. United Air Lines, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 487 (D.
Colo. 1991).
82. 789 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1992).
83. Id. at 1106.
84. Id (footnote omitted).
85. Id. at 1106 n.4.
86. See, e.g., Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250,254 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing
Bonger and rejecting the "would not have hired test" in r6sum6 fraud case).
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(2) Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit is firmly in the Summers camp, having repeat-
edly upheld summary judgment in favor of employers based on after-
acquired evidence of employee misconduct.8 7 In Johnson v. Honey-
well Information Systems, Inc.,88 the Sixth Circuit applied the Sum-
mers causation analysis to a claim brought under Michigan's Elliot-
Larsen Civil Rights Act.8 9 The plaintiff in Johnson filed suit against
her employer for breach of contract and for violations of the Elliot-
Larsen Act after being terminated for allegedly unsatisfactory per-
formance. During discovery, it was revealed that the plaintiff had fal-
sified her employment application by exaggerating the extent of her
education and her relevant work experience.90 On appeal, the Sixth
Circuit held that the plaintiff's numerous falsifications precluded the
grant of any relief because the defendant had established that it would
not have hired the plaintiff and that it would have terminated her had
it become aware of these falsifications during her employment.91 The
Johnson court did not specify the rationale behind its decision, stating
simply that "[w]e agree with the reasoning of the court in Summers
and hold that on these facts, even if we assume that Honeywell dis-
charged Johnson in retaliation for her opposition to violations of the
Act, she is not entitled to relief. 92
The Sixth Circuit refined its analysis in Milligan-Jensen v. Michi-
gan Technological University,93 a case that extended the use of after-
87. See Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological Univ., 975 F.2d 302, 304 (6th Cir.
1992) ("This circuit ... has committed itself to the Summers rule."), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct.
2991, and cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 22 (1993).
88. 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992).
89. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 37.2101-.2804 (1985 & Supp. 1993). Although Michigan
law was unsettled as to the application of the after-acquired evidence doctrine to claims
brought under the Elliot-Larsen Act, the Johnson court "divine[d] what the Michigan high
court would say if faced with the issue." Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d
409, 412 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing Janikowski v. Bendix Corp., 823 F.2d 945, 948 (6th Cir.
1987)). In interpreting state law, the Johnson court, noting that Elliot-Larsen mirrored
Title VII and was intended to provide similar protections, applied the relevant federal law,
namely Summers. Johnson, 955 F.2d at 415 n.1. But see Bazzi v. Western & S. Life Ins.
Co., 808 F. Supp. 1306, 1310 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (refusing to apply after-acquired evidence
doctrine to Elliot-Larsen claim because Michigan civil rights law is "more than a mere
duplication of Title VII"), rev'd, 25 F.3d 1047 (6th Cir. 1994) (table).
90. Specifically, plaintiff claimed to possess a bachelor's degree when she actually had
completed only four university classes; she also claimed to have been managing some
properties in the year preceding her employment with the defendant when in fact she was
unemployed and seeking work. Johnson, 955 F.2d at 411-12.
91. Id. at 415. The Johnson court thus employed both the "would not have hired" and
"would have fired" standards. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
92. Johnson, 955 F.2d at 415.
93. 975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2991, and cert. dismissed, 114
S. Ct. 22 (1993).
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acquired evidence to a wrongful termination suit brought under Title
VII. In Milligan-Jensen, the plaintiff, a public security officer for a
university, filed suit against her employer for gender discrimination
and retaliatory discharge.94 In preparation for trial, the defendant dis-
covered that the plaintiff had omitted a prior DUI conviction from her
employment application.95 At trial, the district court found that the
plaintiff had indeed been discriminated against on account of her gen-
der, yet the court also found that the plaintiff's omission, if discovered
during the course of employment, would have resulted in her immedi-
ate discharge.96 On the basis of these factual findings, the district
judge entered judgment for the plaintiff but exercised the equitable
power of the court and reduced her recovery by one-half.97 The Sixth
Circuit reversed on appeal, taking the occasion to clarify its holding in
Johnson: "The crucial difference between the trial court's approach
and that applied by this court in Johnson is that the trial court bal-
anced the equities, whereas Johnson regards the problem as one of
causation." 98 The Sixth Circuit thus embraces the theory, as did the
Tenth Circuit in Summers, that because the employee would have
been fired had the employer known of the after-discovered miscon-
duct, the employee has not suffered any legal damage by being termi-
nated and is thus barred from recovery.99
The Sixth Circuit took Summers one step further in Dotson v.
United States Postal Service,1°° a handicap discrimination case. The
court in Dotson upheld summary judgment in favor of the employer
on the basis that the discharged employee's application fraud ren-
dered him unqualified for the position. The Dotson court's rationale
differs from Summers in that it does not use after-acquired evidence
of misconduct to rebut plaintiff's claim of injury. Rather, the Dotson
rule allows the after-acquired evidence to negate one element of the
employee's prima facie case of discrimination - that the employee
94. Id. at 302-03.
95. Id. at 303.
96. Id. at 303-04.
97. Id. at 304.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 304-05. See also McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 539,
542 (6th Cir. 1993) ("[W]e have firmly endorsed the principle that after-acquired evidence
is a complete bar to any recovery by the former employee where the employer can show it
would have fired the employee on the basis of the evidence."), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 2099
(1994). In Milligan-Jensen, the court specifically adopted both the "would not have hired"
and "would have fired" standards. 975 F.2d at 304-05. The court did note that other deci-
sions had expressed concern over the "would not have hired" standard in wrongful termi-
nation cases (see supra note 84), but skirted the issue in a footnote. Id. at 305 n.3.
100. 977 F.2d 976 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 263 (1992).
was otherwise "qualified for the position." 1°1 If a complaining party
in a Title VII suit is unable to prove that he or she was initially quali-
fied for the job, an employer will escape liability.102 Thus, unlike the
Summers approach, the Dotson court allows the use of after-acquired
evidence in the qualification stage of the prima facie case. The rule in
Dotson trumps employer liability by preventing the aggrieved party
from even satisfying its initial burden of production.10 3
(3) Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit has not directly addressed the use of after-
acquired evidence in wrongful termination cases. However, in
Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc.,104 the court expressed its support
for a Summers-type rule in a failure-to-hire case. The plaintiff in
Smallwood sued United under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act 0 5 (ADEA) for refusing to process his flight officer applica-
101. Id. at 978. The complainant in a Title VII case carries the initial burden of estab-
lishing a prima facie case of discrimination. This may be done by showing (i) that the
employee belongs to a protected class; (ii) that the employee applied and was qualified for
a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his or her qualifica-
tions, the employee was rejected; and (iv) that, after the employee's rejection, "the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complain-
ant's qualifications." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (em-
phasis added). Thus, in order to survive a motion for summary judgment (or a motion for
judgment as a matter of law), the plaintiff must show, inter alia, that he or she was initially
qualified for the position.
102. Id.
103. Dotson, 977 F.2d at 977-78 (finding that because "honesty and trustworthiness"
were required for the position, plaintiff's application fraud rendered him unqualified). Cf.
Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1424 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that after-acquired evi-
dence of plaintiffs medical condition was admissible to rebut plaintiffs prima facie case of
qualification, but implying that it would not be admissible to justify the employer's deci-
sion). The practice of using after-acquired evidence to rebut the qualification element has
been criticized because the evidence is used to highlight the employee's shortcomings
rather than the employer's motive, whereas the McDonnell Douglas model requires courts
to focus solely on the employer's motivations at this initial stage. McDonnell Douglas, 411
U.S. at 802 n.13 ("The facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification
above of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in
every respect to differing factual situations.") See also Cheryl Krause Zemelman, The Af-
ter-Acquired Evidence Defense to Employment Discrimination Claims: The Privatization of
Title VII and the Contours of Social Responsibility, 46 STAN. L. REV. 175, 181 (1993) (argu-
ing that the purpose of the prima facie case is to create a rebuttable presumption of dis-
crimination). However, in East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395
(1977), the Supreme Court seemed to express its support for just such a rule, at least in
cases involving application rejection: "Even assuming, arguendo, that the company's fail-
ure even to consider the applications was discriminatory, the company was entitled to
prove at trial that the respondents had not been injured because they were not qualified
and would not have been hired in any event." Id. at 404 n.9.
104. 728 F.2d 614 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984).
105. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
November 1994] RETHINKING AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE DEFENSE 261
tion because he was 48 years of age.1°6 At the time of plaintiff's
application, United had a company-wide policy providing that flight
officer applications would not be considered from persons over the
age of 35.107 However, after United denied the plaintiff's application
based on the age restriction, it discovered that the plaintiff had been
fired from his former job for defrauding his employer.1 08 Based on
this after-acquired evidence, United asserted that even if there had
been no age discrimination, the plaintiff still would not have been
hired.109 The trial court disagreed with this position, stating that it
was "'entitled to be and should be, skeptical of after-the-fact decisions
as to what the defendant would have done had it known what it knows
now."' 110 Because the district judge believed that "'only those facts
available to the defendant as of the time of the rejection of the plain-
tiff's application ought to be considered,"' judgment was entered in
favor of the plaintiff.'
The Fourth Circuit reversed. According to the court, the refusal
of the district judge to consider the evidence of plaintiff's fraud was
completely contrary to the "same decision" test"12 set forth in Mount
Healthy." 3 Recognizing that the purpose of a back pay award under
the ADEA is to restore the plaintiff to the position he would have
occupied but for the discrimination, the court held that United's after-
acquired evidence was admissible to show-that it would have made the
same adverse hiring decision even in the absence of any age discrimi-
nation." 4 The court was not troubled by the fact that the evidence
was unknown to United at the time the decision was made." 5 Noting
that it had "found no authority which supports the district court's con-
demnation of what it characterizes as the 'after-the-fact rationale,"'11 6
the Fourth Circuit analyzed the Mount Healthy line of cases and con-
cluded that:
[T]hese cases show.., that the disqualification for employment and
thus for back pay, based on a "recreating [of] the circumstances that
would have existed but for the illegal discrimination" may be estab-
lished by evidence which had not been developed at the time the
106. Smallwood, 728 F.2d at 615.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 620.
109. Id. at 615.
110. Id. at 616.
111. Id.
112. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
113. Id. at 623 (citing Mount Healthy Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,
287 (1977)).
114. Id.
115. Id. (noting that "such evidence [is] to be weighed by the same standards as other
[evidence].").
116. Id.
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claimant was denied employment, provided such evidence is proved
at trial of the remedy issue. 17
Thus, the Fourth Circuit embraces the use of after-acquired evidence
in refusal-to-hire cases for the purpose of showing that an applicant
would not have been hired regardless of any discriminatory animus.
Moreover, based on the Mount Healthy causation test, such a showing
mandates the entry of judgment in favor of the defendant.
District courts within the Fourth Circuit have recently extended
the Smallwood court's reasoning to other types of cases involving re-
sum6 and application fraud. For example, in Rich v. Westland Print-
ers, Inc.,11s a Title VII gender discrimination case, the defendant
moved for summary judgment on the plaintiff's wrongful discharge
claim after discovering that the plaintiff had falsely represented her
educational qualifications on her r6sum6. The district court granted
the employer's motion on the basis of Summers, Milligan-Jensen, and
Johnson.1 9 Although recognizing the absence of clear Fourth Circuit
precedent on the after-acquired evidence issue, the court found the
Summers line of cases to be consistent with the Fourth Circuit's deci-
sion in Smallwood120
In a similar case, Russell v. Microdyne Corporation,12' the plain-
tiff filed suit against her employer for gender discrimination and retal-
iatory discharge in violation of Title VII.122 Based on information
gleaned during discovery that the plaintiff's application and r6sumd
misrepresented her employment and salary history, the employer
moved for summary judgment.' 23 The district court granted the em-
ployer's motion, finding that sufficient evidence existed to show that
the employee would have been terminated for having made the mis-
representations. 24 Citing Smallwood and Mount Healthy, the Russell
court stated, "If an employee never would have been hired or would
have been discharged due to fraudulent statements, no recovery is
warranted, regardless of any alleged adverse employment actions
against the plaintiff."' 125
117. Id. at 624 (quoting Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1097 (8th Cir.
1982), (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
118. No. Civ. A. HAR 92-2475, 1993 WL 220453 (D. Md. June 9, 1993).
119. Id. at *5.
120. Id. ("It appears to the Court that the Smallwood decision is not inconsistent with
those holdings, nor is it inconsistent with the reasoning on which they are based.").
121. 830 F. Supp. 305 (E.D. Va. 1993).
122. Id. at 306.
123. Id. at 306-07.
124. Id. at 308.
125. Id. at 307. But see Boyd v. Rubbermaid Commercial Prods., Inc., No. Civ. A. 91-
0083-H, 1992 WL 404398 (W.D. Va. Dec. 11, 1992) (refusing to "bootstrap a waning area of
Title VII case law [Summers] onto the remedial provisions of the Equal Pay Act").
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(4) Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit has also recently adopted the Summers ration-
ale. In Welch v. Liberty Machine Works, Inc.,126 a case involving
claims for wrongful discharge under ERISA and the Missouri Human
Rights Act, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant employer termi-
nated him from a machinist position in order to avoid liability for
medical expenses under an employee benefits plan.127 Liberty, the
employer, claimed that the plaintiff's discharge was due to a lack of
available work.'2 During discovery in the case, the plaintiff disclosed
for the first time that he had been employed as a machinist immedi-
ately prior to being hired by Liberty, and that he had been fired after
only one month for "unsatisfactory performance."'1 29 After learning
of the plaintiff's prior employment, Liberty filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment in which it argued that it would never have hired the
plaintiff had it been aware at the time of the plaintiff's work history.
30
Alternatively, Liberty argued that it would have immediately fired the
plaintiff once it learned of the omission, citing in support of this asser-
tion its written policy that "any misstatement or omission of fact on
[an employment] application shall be considered cause for dismis-
sal.' 31 Anticipating that the Eighth Circuit would adopt the Sum-
mers rule, the district court granted Liberty's motion for summary
judgment.132
The Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court that after-ac-
quired evidence of application fraud could bar recovery for discrimi-
natory discharge, yet the court reversed on the ground that the
employer had not met its evidentiary burden on the summary judg-
ment motion.'33 Noting the split of authority on the after-acquired
evidence issue, the court commented as follows:
[W]e find that the Summers rule is the better rule. In the applica-
tion fraud context, therefore, we find that after-acquired evidence
of employee misrepresentation bars recovery for an unlawful dis-
126. 23 F.3d 1403 (8th Cir. 1994).
127. Id. at 1404.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1406. The Welch panel's decision to adopt the majority approach was
sharply criticized by Judge Morris Sheppard Arnold in dissent. Id. at 1406 (Arnold, J.,
dissenting). Judge Arnold's views largely reflect those of the Eleventh Circuit panel deci-
sion in Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992), vacated and reh'g en
banc granted, No. 91-7406, 1994 WL 481439 (11th Cir. Sept. 6, 1994). See Part II.B.1 infra.
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charge, if the employer establishes that it would not have hired the
employee had it known of the misrepresentation. 34
In spite of its holding on the Summers issue, the Welch court con-
cluded that Liberty's proof, which consisted solely of a self-serving
affidavit by its company president, was insufficient to meet its burden
under Rule 56.135 The court believed that Liberty, as the movant for
summary judgment, bore a "substantial burden of establishing that the
policy pre-dated the hiring and firing of the employee in question and
that the policy constitute[d] more than mere contract or employment
application boilerplate."'1 36 Here, the court noted that Liberty had not
adduced any further evidence substantiating its policies and therefore
was not entitled to summary judgment. 137
The quantum-of-proof problem identified by the Welch court is a
recurring one in after-acquired evidence cases. Specifically, the ques-
tion is whether an employer is able to offer sufficient evidence to sus-
tain its burden as a movant under Rule 56. Typically, an employer
moving for summary judgment under the "would have fired" standard
will rarely be able to produce the perfect piece of evidence to support
its claim - namely, evidence that the employer had previously discov-
ered an employee's application fraud and fired the employee on that
ground.138 Usually, as in Welch, an employer can offer only self-serv-
ing affidavits of management stating the company's unequivocal pol-
icy of terminating employees who commit application fraud.
However, because Welch would seem to reject such evidence as satis-
fying the employer's burden in most instances, 139 the case leaves un-
answered the question of what, if anything, an employer can do to
134. Welch, 23 F.3d at 1405. Note that the Welch court's holding relies exclusively on
the "would not have hired" rationale, even though the case involved alleged wrongful dis-
charge. Thus, despite the court's assertion that its decision "does not vitiate the 'would
have fired' prong of the Summers rule," id. at 1405 n.2, the decision does demonstrate that
the Eighth Circuit rejects the idea that "would have fired" is the only appropriate inquiry
in a wrongful discharge case. See Bonger v. American Well Works, 789 F. Supp. 1102, 1106
n.4 (D. Colo. 1992) (rejecting the "would not have hired" standard in wrongful termination
case); Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250, 254 (7th Cir. 1992) (same).
135. Welch, 23 F.3d at 1405-06. Rule 56 permits the entry of summary judgment "if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
136. Welch, 23 F.3d at 1405.
137. Id.
138. In one case, however, the employer was able to point to at least three instances in
which employees were terminated for making false representations on their r6sum~s or
applications. Miller v. Beneficial Management Corp., 855 F. Supp 691, 706 (D.N.J. 1994).
139. The Welch court left open the possibility that such evidence could support a sum-
mary judgment motion on other facts: "We do not decide whether an undisputed employer
affidavit could, in some circumstances, establish the requisite material fact of a particular
employer's policy. Rather, we find merely that in this case, [the employer's] affidavit was
not sufficient." Welch, 23 F.3d at 1406.
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satisfy its "substantial burden."'140 As a practical matter, therefore,
the district court's careful consideration of the proffered evidence on a
Rule 56 motion may pose a significant and perhaps much-needed
check on an employer's ability to obtain summary judgment in after-
acquired evidence cases.14'
B. The Minority View: After-Acquired Evidence as a Partial Limitation
on Remedies
An increasing number of courts have rejected the reasoning of
Summers and its progeny. 42 This minority approach refuses to allow
after-acquired evidence to completely bar a complaining party's re-
covery and instead considers the evidence only as a partial limitation
140. Id. The court alternatively characterizes the movant's burden in this situation as
"substantial" or "significant." Id.
141. Consistent with this idea, a few courts implicitly accepting the Summers rationale
have nevertheless denied summary judgment because of a deficiency of proof under the
Rule 56(c) standard. See Reed v. AMAX Coal Co., 971 F.2d 1295, 1298 (7th Cir. 1992)
("AMAX never proved that it would have fired Reed for lying on his application; it only
proved that it could have done so. AMAX did not, for instance, provide proof that other
employees were fired in similar circumstances."); Mackey v. Board of Pensions of the
United Methodist Church, No. 91 C 5739, 1993 WL 11674, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 1993)
(finding the employer's self-serving affidavits insufficient to establish materiality "in view
of the importance of this inquiry to the application of the after-acquired evidence
doctrine").
These cases, however, represent the exception rather than the rule. The overwhelm-
ing majority of cases embracing Summers accept at face value the employer's affidavits and
shift the burden to the employee to rebut the affidavits by contrary evidence. See, e.g.,
Jackson v. Integra Inc., 30 F.3d 141 (unpublished disposition), 1994 WL 379305, at *2 (10th
Cir. 1994) (burden shifted to plaintiff after employer submitted affidavit of manager); Da-
vis v. Pyramid Prods., Inc., No. 93-CV-72174-DT, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11761 (E.D.
Mich. June 6, 1994) (same); Russell v. Microdyne Corp. 830 F. Supp. 305, 308 (E.D. Va.
1993) (boilerplate language in employment application "is persuasive evidence that the
employer would terminate the employee"); Redd v. Fisher Controls, 814 F. Supp. 547, 552-
53 (W.D. Tex. 1992) (similar boilerplate language "is specific enough for this Court to
believe Plaintiff was adequately apprised of the potential result" of her application fraud);
Baab v. AMR Servs. Corp., 811 F. Supp. 1246, 1259 (N.D. Ohio 1993) ("[E]stablishment of
materiality will often be a matter of common logic, easily supportable by affidavit."). The
relative ease with which employers have been able to meet their burden under Rule 56
renders suspect the assertion of counsel in one case that "[t]he circuits applying the [after-
acquired evidence] doctrine to bar relief have articulated a high standard of proof that
employers must meet on a motion for summary judgment to show that a discrimination
plaintiff is entitled to no relief." Brief for Respondent at 17, McKennon v. Nashville Ban-
ner Publishing Co., No. 93-1543 (U.S. Sept. 8, 1994).
142. See, e.g., Kristufek v. Hussman Foodservice Co., 985 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993); Wal-
lace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992), vacated and reh'g en banc granted,
No. 91-7406, 1994 WL 481439 (11th Cir. Sept. 6, 1994); Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel &
Casino, 828 F. Supp. 314 (D.NJ. 1993); Benitez v. Portland Gen. Elec., No. CV 91-864-PA,
1992 WL 278104 (D. Or. Mar. 31, 1992). See also E.E.O.C. v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d
891, 901-02 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting after-acquired evidence defense in dicta).
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on a prevailing plaintiff's available remedies. 143 According to these
courts, using after-acquired evidence to preclude all available relief
contravenes the legislative goals of Title VII.144 Specifically, the mi-
nority view argues that the Summers rationale allows an employer,
first, to benefit from information discovered only as a result of its dis-
criminatory acts and, second, to escape liability for its unlawful em-
ployment decision by proffering a justification that did not motivate it
at the moment the decision was made.145
(1) Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit initiated the backlash against Summers in
Wallace v. Dunn Construction Company,146 the most pronounced de-
parture to date from Summers. In Wallace, the plaintiff sued her em-
ployer under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act for sex-based
discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliatory discharge. 147 The
employer learned in discovery that the plaintiff, in completing her em-
ployment application, had falsely denied ever having been convicted
of a crime. Actually, the plaintiff had been convicted in Alabama of
cocaine and marijuana possession prior to her application for employ-
ment with the defendant. 48 The employer moved for summary judg-
ment on the basis of this after-acquired evidence, arguing that the
plaintiffs prior convictions, as well as her misrepresentations regard-
ing those convictions, "served as a legitimate cause for terminating
[her] employment irrespective of any alleged illegal unlawful [sic] mo-
tives.' u 49 The district court denied the motion as a matter of law, re-
jecting the defendant's after-acquired evidence defense. 150
On appeal, two judges of the Eleventh Circuit panel agreed with
the district court's rejection of the Summers defense, but concluded
that partial summary judgment was appropriate on the plaintiff's
claims of reinstatement, front pay, and injunctive relief.151 Criticizing
143. Although the courts adopting the minority view uniformly preclude reinstate-
ment, promotion, hiring, or front pay, the approach varies with respect to the specific limi-
tations imposed on a successful litigant's award of back pay. Compare Wallace, 968 F.2d at
1182 (limiting back pay award only if employer can show it would have discovered em-
ployee misconduct before end of back pay period) with Smith v. General Scanning, Inc.,
876 F.2d 1315, 1319 n.2 (7th Cir. 1989) (barring from eligibility employee for any back pay
award after the fraud was discovered). See infra notes 165-169 and accompanying text.
144. Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1180.
145. Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F. Supp. 314, 322-24 (D.N.J. 1993).
146. 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992), vacated reh'g en banc granted, No. 91-7406, 1994
WL 481439 (11th Cir. Sept. 6, 1994).
147. Id. at 1176.
148. Id. at 1176-77.
149. Id. at 1177.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1184.
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Summers as "antithetical to the principal purpose of Title VII," the
Wallace court found that the after-acquired evidence could not affect
the employee's potential awards of back pay, lost wages, or liquidated
damages because those remedies were necessary to effectuate the
"make whole" purposes of the statute.152 According to the court, a
rule that permits evidence discovered after the fact to defeat these
remedial awards would place the plaintiff "in a worse position than if
she had not been a member of a protected class or engaged in pro-
tected conduct."'1 53 Consistent with this notion, the court refused to
end the back pay period on the date that the employer discovered the
fraud, reasoning that such an approach "would have the perverse ef-
fect of providing a windfall to employers who, in the absence of their
unlawful act and the ensuing litigation, would never have discovered
any after-acquired evidence."'1 54 In order to limit a back pay award,
an employer must demonstrate that, notwithstanding its unlawful acts
and the resulting litigation, it would have discovered the evidence
sometime prior to what would otherwise have been the end of the
back pay period.155
The Wallace court's approach does incorporate one critical aspect
of Summers - namely, that after-acquired evidence is relevant in cal-
culating the relief to be awarded a successful Title VII plaintiff. In-
deed, the Wallace court acknowledged that "[a] sufficient showing of
after-acquired evidence mandates the drawing of a boundary between
the preservation of the employer's lawful prerogatives and the resto-
ration of the discrimination victim.' 56 However, the dividing line
drawn by the Wallace court differs dramatically from Summers.
Whereas the Tenth Circuit in Summers implicitly held that after-the-
fact rationales may be included in considering what actions an em-
ployer may permissibly take, Wallace finds such rationales to be sepa-
rate and distinct from an employer's lawful prerogatives because they
were not present at the moment the adverse employment decision was
made.
The effect of Wallace on refusal to hire cases brought under the
federal antidiscrimination statutes is not clear. In Puhy v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 57 the district court found that Wallace imposed no bar on
the use of after-acquired evidence in a refusal-to-hire case brought
under the ADEA. According to the Puhy court, the principal concern
152. Id. at 1180-83.
153. Id. at 1180.
154. Id. at 1182.
155. Id One commentator has noted that this rule establishes "a virtually insurmount-
able evidentiary hurdle for employers to overcome in halting the backpay period." John-
son, supra note 14, at 77.
156. Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1181.
157. 833 F. Supp. 1577 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
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of the Wallace opinion was to prevent the use of after-acquired evi-
dence to place the plaintiff in a worse position than if she had not
been a member of the protected class.' 58 Thus, allowing after-ac-
quired evidence to negate the plaintiff's claim in a Wallace-type
wrongful discharge case would cause the employer's discrimination to
place the plaintiff in a worse position at law - that is, the plaintiff
who was previously employed would, as a result of evidence discov-
ered in the ensuing litigation, be jobless and without a remedy. 59
However, in an application rejection case, in which the plaintiff is job-
less to begin with, the use of after-acquired evidence does not have
this detrimental effect.' 60 The Puhy court held that subsequent evi-
dence is admissible to show that the complaining applicant was not
injured because he or she would not have been hired even in the ab-
sence of discrimination. 16'
The Puhy court found support for its position in Wallace, because
the court appeared to draw a distinction between refusal-to-hire cases
and wrongful discharge cases: "no injuries to the plaintiffs [are] possi-
ble [in refusal to hire cases] because, in fact, they never would have
been hired even absent the discriminatory motive."'1 62 Yet, although
the Puhy court's reasoning seems to be consistent with the idea ex-
pressed in Wallace that Title VII plaintiffs not be placed in a worse
position by the employer's conduct, this reasoning nonetheless cuts
against the idea, also expressed in Wallace, that employers be en-
couraged to eliminate discrimination in employment. 63 Because the
rule articulated in Puhy would allow after-acquired evidence to cut off
a complaining party's available relief in a refusal-to-hire case, it does
not, under the logic employed in Wallace, deter employers from en-
gaging in discriminatory hiring practices. The rule thus appears to
draw an arbitrary distinction between refusal-to-hire cases and wrong-
ful discharge cases based solely on the fact that wrongful discharge
plaintiffs have more to lose. 64
158. Id. at 1582 (citing Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1179 (11th Cir.
1992) vacated reh'g en banc granted, No. 91-7406, 1994 WL 481439 (11th Cir. Sept. 6,
1994)).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Despite this holding, the court denied the employer's motion for summary judg-
ment on other grounds. See id. at 1582-86.
162. Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1179 n.8.
163. Id. at 1180.
164. Cf Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 830 F. Supp. 305, 308 (E.D. Va. 1993) (finding that
the harm caused by discriminatory failure to promote is "far less severe" than that caused
by discriminatory discharge).
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(2) Seventh Circuit
Although the Seventh Circuit has also repudiated the Summers
rule, it takes a less altruistic approach with respect to a successful
plaintiff's back pay award. In Smith v. General Scanning, Inc.,165 a
wrongful discharge case brought under the ADEA, the employer
moved for summary judgment based on its post-termination discovery
of the plaintiff's r6sum6 falsifications. The Seventh Circuit explicitly
rejected the employer's after-the-fact rationale, observing that
whether the plaintiff was discriminated against "must be decided
solely with respect to the reason given for his discharge .... His
r6sum6 fraud is, for this purpose, irrelevant."'166 However, the Smith
court noted that the after-acquired evidence of the plaintiff's fraud
"would be highly relevant" to the issue of appropriate relief if the
defendant were found liable on the discrimination charge.' 67 In such a
case, the plaintiff would not be eligible for reinstatement, nor could he
obtain any back pay for the period after the fraud was discovered.' 68
Thus, to the extent that it rejects the after-the-fact rationale as an
absolute bar to relief, the Seventh Circuit's approach is consonant
with the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit panel in Wallace. The two
approaches differ, however, with respect to the amount of relief avail-
able to an otherwise prevailing plaintiff. Whereas both the Wallace
panel opinion and the Seventh Circuit deny reinstatement or promo-
tion in the face of an employer's after-acquired evidence, the Seventh
Circuit takes a different approach on the issue of back pay - it limits
the plaintiff's award to the time between the discharge and the discov-
ery of the fraud.' 69
Despite the language of Smith, the Seventh Circuit seemed to
waver in its commitment to the minority approach in a subsequent
case involving application fraud. In Reed v. AMAX Coal Co.,' 70 the
Seventh Circuit flatly rejected AMAX's after-acquired evidence de-
fense. However, the court did not disapprove of the defendant's posi-
tion on the grounds that the Summers rationale was invalid, but rather
because the employer had failed to meet its evidentiary burden under
the Summers rule.17 ' Although the Reed court could have resolved
the application fraud issue simply by referring to its decision in Smith,
165. 876 F.2d 1315 (7th Cir. 1989).
166. Id. at 1319.
167. Id. at 1319 n.2 (citing Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700,
704-05, 708 (10th Cir. 1988)).
168. Id.
169. See Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250,253 n.2 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Smith
implies that the plaintiff, if he otherwise proves his case, is entitled to backpay accumula-
tion between the time of discharge and the time the fraud is discovered.").
170. 971 F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1992).
171. Id. at 1298.
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it chose instead to distinguish the facts from Summers, finding that
AMAX had proven only that it could have terminated the plaintiff for
his misstatements, and not that it would have actually done so.172 In
so doing, the court implied that an employer could completely avoid
liability under Title VII by proffering evidence which, although dis-
covered subsequent to the challenged employment decision, would
have resulted in immediate discharge if known:
We must require similar proof to prevent employers from avoiding
Title VII liability by pointing to minor rule violations which may
technically subject the employee to dismissal but would not, in fact,
result in discharge.
Unlike the employer in Summers, AMAX never proved that it
would have fired Reed for lying on his application; it only proved
that it could have done SO. 1 7 3
In addition to its implicit adoption of the majority view in Reed,
the Seventh Circuit has also upheld summary judgment in favor of an
employer on the basis of after-acquired evidence. In Washington v.
Lake County, Illinois,174 Washington was terminated from his position
as a jailer and later brought suit under Title VII, alleging that his dis-
charge was motivated by racial considerations. During discovery, the
employer learned that Washington had concealed information regard-
ing his criminal record when completing his employment applica-
tion.175  The employer argued that summary judgment was
appropriate because Washington either would not have been hired
had his criminal convictions been known, or would have been fired
upon the subsequent discovery of his falsehoods.176 The appellate
court agreed that no genuine issue of fact existed as to whether the
employer would have fired Washington, but the court rejected the em-
ployer's alternate "would not have hired" argument. 177 Drawing an
analogy to the "same decision" test set forth in the mixed-motive
cases,178 the Washington court held that the temporal focus of the liti-
gation should govern the appropriate standard to be employed -
either "would not have hired" or "would have fired."'1 79 Accordingly,
in a wrongful discharge suit, the proper question would be whether
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. 969 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992).
175. Id. at 251.
176. Id. at 253-56.
177. Id. at 256.
178. See supra text accompanying note 33.
179. Id. at 255-56. The court also noted that this approach would reduce an employer's
incentive to scour through an employee's files in the hope of finding "'minor, trivial or
technical infractions' on an employee's application or r~sum6." Id. (quoting O'Driscoll v.
Hercules, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 656, 659 (D. Utah 1990), affd, 12 F.3d 176 (10th Cir.) petition
for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3757 (U.S. Apr. 1, 1994) (No. 93-1728)).
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the employee would have been terminated; similarly, in a wrongful
refusal-to-hire case, the appropriate issue would be whether the plain-
tiff would have been hired in light of the after-acquired evidence.180
In support of this rule, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the decision in
Bonger v. American Water Works' 81 that in certain situations, a critical
distinction exists between the "would not have hired" and the "would
have fired" standards. 82 More specifically, an employer may refuse
to hire an applicant if the employer knows at the time of the appli-
cant's r6sum6 fraud. However, once the applicant is hired, the em-
ployer may be very reluctant to fire the individual on the basis of a
transgression which, in retrospect, may seem trivial or insignificant. 83
Despite its ruling in favor of the employer, the Washington court
did not embrace the majority approach. Indeed, the court noted that
it was deciding the after-acquired evidence issue only because the
plaintiff had failed to challenge the validity of the doctrine.' 84
Although it made reference to its earlier decision in Smith, the Wash-
ington court did not consider whether the plaintiff had a right to back
pay under the reasoning of that case because the issue was not raised
on appeal.' 85 Thus, the Seventh Circuit's support of summary judg-
ment in Washington should not be read as an adoption of the majority
approach because the court was required to decide the Summers issue
before it.
The Seventh Circuit's commitment to the minority approach was
ultimately reaffirmed in Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodservice Co. 186
The court here returned to the rule it set forth in Smith that a "dis-
criminatory firing must be decided solely with respect to the known
circumstances leading to the discharge."'18 Accordingly, the Kristufek
court found the after-acquired evidence of the plaintiff's r6sum6 fraud
irrelevant to the issue of liability, stating that "the deterring statutory
penalty is for retaliatory firing, the character of which is not changed
by some after discovered alternate reason for discharge which might
otherwise have been used, but was not."' 88 The court concluded that
the defendant's subsequent evidence was relevant only to the damages
180. Washington, 969 F.2d at 255-56 & n.5. The court stated that generally, "the hypo-
thetical inquiry should correspond to the time of the allegedly discriminatory employment
decision." Id. at 256 n.5.
181. 789 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1992). See supra text accompanying notes 81-86.
182. Washington, 969 F.2d at 255 n.5.
183. See supra text accompanying note 85.
184. Id. at 253 ("Although this court has never squarely adopted the Summers ration-
ale, Washington does not challenge its validity.").
185. Id. at 253 n.2.
186. 985 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993).
187. Id. at 369 (citing Smith v. General Scanning, Inc., 876 F.2d 1315, 1319 (7th, Cir.
1989)).
188. Id.
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calculus and ordered the back pay award reduced, as per Smith, so as
to not include the time after the fraud was discovered. 8 9 In refusing
to allow an employer to escape sanction completely by asserting an
after the fact rationale, the Seventh Circuit's latest pronouncement on
the Summers doctrine places the court squarely within the minority
camp. The only wrinkle in the Seventh Circuit's approach is that an
employer may reduce its back pay liability to the period before it dis-
covered the employee's misconduct or fraud, whereas the approach of
the Eleventh Circuit Wallace panel is to award back pay until the date
of judgment.
(3) Third Circuit
The Third Circuit has also recently decided a case involving the
after-acquired evidence defense. In Mardell v. Harleysville Life Insur-
ance Company,190 the court resolved a conflict among the district
courts within the Third Circuit by expressly repudiating the Summers
rationale and instead aligning itself with the approach of the Eleventh
Circuit Wallace panel.191 The plaintiff in Mardell, a 52-year-old wo-
man, was terminated from her position as Branch Manager for what
the company alleged was poor work performance. 192 After learning
that the employer had filled her position with a younger male, the
plaintiff brought suit for gender and age discrimination under Title
VII and the ADEA. 193 However, following the employer's post-ter-
mination discovery of the plaintiff's r6sum6 fraud, the district court
granted summary judgment for the employer. 94 The Third Circuit
reversed. 95
In its detailed opinion, the Mardell court carefully examined the
arguments advanced in favor of the Summers rule, yet found them all
to be inconsistent with the "plain meaning" of Title VII and the
ADEA. 96 Among other things, the court found untenable the notion
189. Id. at 371.
190. 31 F.3d 1221 (3d Cir. 1994).
191. Prior to Mardell, district courts within the Third Circuit were divided on the appli-
cation of the after-acquired evidence doctrine. Compare Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel
& Casino, 828 F. Supp. 314, 322 (D.N.J. 1993) (denying summary judgment and adopting
minority approach) with Miller v. Beneficial Management Corp., 855 F. Supp. 691 (D.NJ.
1994) (adopting Summers rule).
192. Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1222-23.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1222. During discovery, the employer learned that the plaintiff had grossly
overstated her employment experience and had falsely represented that she had a college
degree. Id. at 1223-24. The employer moved for summary judgment based on this evi-
dence, claiming that the plaintiff would have been terminated immediately upon discovery
of the falsifications. Id. at 1224.
195. Id. at 1222.
196. Id. at 1231.
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that a plaintiff suffers no injury from invidious discrimination simply
because material evidence of misconduct is subsequently discovered
by the employer. 197 According to the court, such reasoning operates
"to deprecate the federal right transgressed and to heap insult ('[y]ou
had it coming') upon injury. A victim of discrimination suffers a de-
humanizing injury as real as, and often of far more severe and lasting
harm than, a blow to the jaw."'1 98 The court thus concluded that even
wrongdoers have a right to recover for discriminatory treatment on
the job.199
Consistent with this view, the Third Circuit held in Mardell that
after-acquired evidence of employee misconduct is inadmissible at the
liability stage of a Title VII proceeding because such evidence is
wholly irrelevant to the determination of employer liability.200 The
court agreed, however, that after-acquired evidence could be relevant
at the remedies stage of the proceedings. 201 Specifically, such evi-
dence could operate to bar an equitable remedy such as reinstatement
which, in the context of balancing employee and employer rights,
"would be particularly invasive of the employer's 'traditional manage-
ment prerogatives'... ,,202 With respect to the back pay remedy, the
Third Circuit adopted the approach of the Wallace panel: an em-
ployer is liable for back pay up until the moment of judgment, unless
it can demonstrate that it would have discovered the evidence at an
earlier point.203 In adopting this rule, the court criticized the Seventh
Circuit's approach in Kristufek 204 - which ends the back pay period
at the moment the employer actually obtains the after-acquired evi-
dence - as inconsistent with the deterrent and remedial goals of Title
VII.205
(4) Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
As the government body charged with enforcing the policies of
Title VII, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission20 6
"(EEOC) has also provided official recommendations for the treatment
of after-acquired evidence. Initially, the EEOC adopted a variation of
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1232 (citation omitted).
199. Id. at 1233.
200. Id. at 1238 (after-acquired evidence "may not be introduced substantively for the
purpose of defending against liability").
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1240.
203. Id. at 1239-40.
204. See supra text accompanying note 189.
205. Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1239.
206. The EEOC was vested with civil enforcement powers under Title VII by the 1972
Equal Opportunity Act. Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4(a), 86 Stat. 103, 104 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1988)).
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the majority approach.20 7 Citing Summers, the EEOC agreed that af-
ter-acquired evidence of employee misconduct could bar reinstate-
ment and back pay, but stated that the employee would still be
entitled to attorney's fees.208 However, in an Enforcement Guidance
issued in 1992, the EEOC reversed its position and recommended that
after-acquired evidence be used to preclude reinstatement, but not
back pay.20 9 The 1992 Enforcement Guidance also adopted the Sev-
enth Circuit's position on the calculation of the back pay award, rec-
ommending that the plaintiff's award be limited to the period between
the discriminatory firing and the date the employer learned of the
plaintiffs misconduct.210 Despite these official pronouncements, the
EEOC's position has been roundly criticized both for going too far in
preserving an employee's right to relief,21' and also for not going far
enough in that direction.212 Accordingly, the EEOC's recommenda-
tions will have little practical effect on the resolution of the after-ac-
quired evidence problem.213
i. Going to Extremes: Shortcomings in the Current
Treatment of After-acquired Evidence
Any proposed resolution of the after-acquired evidence problem
must remain consistent with Title VII's dual objectives of deterring
employers from discriminatory conduct and redressing the injuries
suffered by victims of discrimination.21 4 Nevertheless, in effectuating
these twin goals, the ideal solution should not lose sight of their inher-
ent limits - an employee who has suffered discrimination should be
afforded a remedy, but should not be granted an undeserved wind-
207. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Policy Guidance No. N-915.063,
1991 WL 70108 at *8 (Mar. 7, 1991).
208. Id. The EEOC Policy Guidance also stated that an employee in this situation
would be entitled to injunctive relief, but only to prevent the employer "from discriminat-
ing in a similar fashion in the future." Id. at *8-9.
209. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Revised Enforcement Guidance No.
915-002, 1992 WL 189088, at *8 (July 14, 1992).
210. Id.
211. See Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 830 F. Supp. 305, 308 (E.D. Va. 1993). The Rus-
sell court found that the EEOC's position was "not entitled to any deference" because it
was not an official agency guideline. Id. Moreover, the court noted that even EEOC
guidelines lack the persuasive effect of agency rules, because the latter have been subjected
to notice and comment. Id.
212. See Zemelman, supra note 103, at 204-05 (stating that the EEOC guidelines
"should garner little weight" because they are poorly reasoned, conclusory, and inconsis-
tent with the agency's earlier recommendations).
213. Id. at 204 ("[Tlhe EEOC recommendations will simply add to the debate among
the circuits.").
214. See supra note 19.
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fall.215 The majority and minority approaches to the after-acquired
evidence problem both fail to abide by these principles. First, by pre-
cluding all relief to a complaining party despite an employer's discrim-
inatory conduct, the majority approach does not deter discrimination;
nor does it make a victim whole. By the same token, the minority
view's generous approach to the problem provides a windfall to an
employee who is otherwise undeserving of relief - that is, it provides
a remedy not only for the employer's discrimination, but also for the
loss of a job to which the employee was not entitled.
A. Deficiencies in the Majority Approach
The majority approach, born out of Summers, is unsound for the
simple reason that it misapplies the "same decision" test set forth in
Mount Healthy.216 This test, as the name implies, requires an em-
ployer to show that it would have made the same adverse employment
decision in the absence of a forbidden discriminatory motive.217 An
employer cannot, therefore, make such a showing by relying on infor-
mation that was not known to it "at the time of the decision. ' 218 This
type of post hoc rationalization would undermine Title VII by al-
lowing an employer to justify a proven discriminatory employment de-
cision with reasons both unrelated to the decision and unknown to the
employer at the time the decision was made.21 9 To the extent that
Summers and its progeny rest on this erroneous assumption, they are
incorrect.
The majority approach also neglects the twin aims of Title VII
because it does not encourage employers to eliminate discriminatory
employment practices and because it fails to provide a remedy in the
face of proven discrimination. Employers are not sufficiently deterred
from engaging in discriminatory conduct under a rule that allows them
to escape liability completely by scouring a complaining employee's
record for the perfect ex post facto justification.220 Title VII contem-
215. Cf Cline v. Roadway Express, Inc., 689 F.2d 481,490 (4th Cir. 1982) ("The order-
ing equitable principle is that a compensatory back-pay award should only make the
wrongly discharged employee monetarily whole ... it should not provide a windfall.").
216. See supra text accompanying note 33.
217. Mount Healthy Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
218. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,250 (1989). See also supra note 24 and
accompanying text.
219. See Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co, 31 F.3d 1221, 1228 (3d Cir. 1994) ("What
sets an after-acquired evidence case far apart from a mixed-motives case .. . is that the
articulated 'legitimate' reason, which was non-existent at the time of the adverse decision,
could not possibly have motivated the employer to the slightest degree.").
220. See Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174,1180 (11th Cir. 1992) ("The Sum-
mers rule does not encourage employers to eliminate discrimination. Rather, it invites
employers to establish ludicrously low thresholds for 'legitimate' termination and to devote
fewer resources to preventing discrimination because Summers gives them the option to
plates a much more exacting deterrent function, regardless of an em-
ployee's own dishonesty or turpitude.221 As for the remedial purpose
of the statute, the majority approach improperly precludes all relief
despite the existence of proven discrimination. Title VII was enacted
to eradicate discrimination in employment: To that noble end, when a
complaining party is able to demonstrate that she was an actual victim
of discrimination, courts should not withhold relief that is carefully
tailored to remedy that particular evil.222 The majority approach is
accurate in asserting that an employee who has no right to a job be-
cause of misconduct or r6sum6 fraud is not legally harmed by the sub-
sequent deprivation of employment. However, the majority view's
wholesale preclusion of relief overlooks the fact that the employee has
nevertheless been harmed by the discrimination. The Summers rule is
thus too rigid in its causation analysis. Although an appropriate rule
needs to guard against an unwarranted windfall, it must also account
for the evils of an employer's discriminatory conduct.
B. Deficiencies in the Minority Approach
The minority approach is similarly flawed in that its relief frame-
work goes beyond the dual objectives of Title VII and fails to ade-
quately account for the aggrieved employee's dishonesty. By
providing a compensatory award to employees who have either used
illegitimate means to obtain employment or have behaved improperly
in the course of that employment, the minority approach in effect
grants the employee an undeserved windfall. Title VII's remedial goal
is "sufficiently vindicated" if a discriminatee is placed in no worse a
position than he or she would have occupied in the absence of dis-
crimination. 223 The minority view argues that the use of after-ac-
quired evidence to defeat a successful plaintiff's back pay award does
place the plaintiff in a worse position, because this evidence would not
have been discovered absent the discrimination and the plaintiff
would therefore still be employed. 224 This approach essentially legiti-
escape all liability by rummaging through an unlawfully discharged employee's background
for flaws and then manufacturing a 'legitimate' reason for the discharge ...."), vacated
reh'g en banc granted, No 91-7406, 1994 WL 481439 (11th Cir. Sept. 6, 1994).
221. Cf. Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1181 n.10 ("[E]ven if the doctrine of clean hands were
applicable to this case, the effect of this equitable doctrine would be limited by the reme-
dial goals of Title VII ....").
222. As discussed later, a "carefully tailored" remedy in the after-acquired evidence
context accounts for the discrimination suffered, but does not provide an undeserved
award for the loss of a job that the employee or applicant should not have enjoyed in the
first place. See supra Part IV.
223. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975). Cf. Mount Healthy
City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,285-86 (1977) (finding that the constitu-
tional right is sufficiently vindicated if the employee is not placed in a worse position).
224. Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1180-81.
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mizes an employee's transgressions by rewarding those who are able
to conceal such transgressions. The minority approach provides a
bounty for those persons whose misconduct is discovered as a result of
filing a discrimination suit rather than through some legitimate means.
Regardless of how the misconduct is detected, employees should not
benefit from their misdeeds so long as the employers are punished for
their discriminatory practices. More specifically, although the em-
ployee should be entitled to some remedy for the actual discrimina-
tion, the issuance of back pay transcends the "make whole" and
deterrent objectives of the statute.
IV. Redefining the Proper Role of After-Acquired Evidence
A sensible approach to the after-acquired evidence problem oc-
cupies a position somewhere in between the rigid causation analysis
set forth in Summers and the altruistic formula embraced by courts
adopting the minority approach. Whereas the draconian rule of Sum-
mers undermines Title Vii's twin objectives, the overprotective minor-
ity rule errs by focusing exclusively on the employer's misdeeds and
trivializing the often severe transgressions of the complaining party.
In order to balance these competing considerations in the after-ac-
quired evidence context, courts should provide a carefully tailored
remedy for the discrimination suffered by an employee, but they
should not compensate the employee for the loss of a job which was
undeserved in the first place.
The amended liability and relief provisions of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 should provide guidance in striking this balance. To the
extent that these provisions reflect Congress's intention to circum-
scribe a plaintiff's remedies in the face of competing interests, they are
relevant to all situations that present similar competing interests, in-
cluding those cases involving after-acquired evidence. The 1991 Act
amended Title VII to impose liability on employers whenever imper-
missible motives play a role in employment decisions.225 Nonetheless,
in situations in which an employer is able to demonstrate that it would
have come to the same decision even in the absence of an impermissi-
ble motive, Congress placed severe limitations on a complaining
party's available relief.226 Although these specific provisions of the
1991 Act were directed primarily at mixed-motive situations,227 they
may also have a useful application in after-acquired evidence cases
because both situations require the balancing of competing interests.
The mixed-motive model requires the balancing of the employee's
225. See supra note 18.
226. In this situation, Congress specifically precluded an award of damages, reinstate-
ment, hiring, promotion, or back pay. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (Supp. III 1991).
227. See supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
right to be free from discrimination against the employer's remaining
freedom to base its employment decisions on any other permissible
criteria.228 The after-acquired evidence model has a analogous func-
tion: In these situations, a person's right to be free from invidious
discrimination must be carefully weighed against the equitable notion
that an unqualified or deceitful employee should not be granted a liti-
gation windfall.229
A. Employer Liability
As under the minority approach, after-acquired evidence should
never completely absolve an employer of liability.2 30 If a plaintiff is
able to demonstrate that an adverse employment decision was moti-
vated by a prohibited discriminatory reason, the employer should be
found liable regardless of any newly revealed evidence.231 The major-
ity approach avoids the question of liability by focusing exclusively on
the question of available relief.232 However, because the plaintiff is
not considered to have suffered an injury in light of the defendant's
after-acquired evidence, all available relief is precluded and liability
ceases to be an issue.233
Because a plaintiff who is able to prove the existence of discrimi-
nation should receive some form of remedy, the blending of the liabil-
ity and relief stages will no longer be appropriate. Under this Note's
proposal, plaintiffs who make a sufficient showing at trial should al-
ways be entitled to a remedy for the proven discrimination. Employ-
ers may not, therefore, avoid a finding of liability by using after-
acquired evidence to negate the plaintiffs claim of injury. At best,
228. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989).
229. It is a well-established principle that "'when a wrong has been done, and the law
gives a remedy, the compensation shall be equal to the injury."' Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (quoting Wicker v. Hoppock, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 94, 99
(1867)). Accordingly, courts should fashion relief such that complaining parties are com-
pensated to the full extent of their injuries, and so that the compensation accorded a dis-
crimination victim does not exceed the scope of the injury so as to provide a surplus
remedy.
230. See Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1228 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Af-
ter-acquired evidence, simply put, is not relevant in establishing liability under Title VII
231. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. III 1991) ("an unlawful employment practice is
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other fac-
tors also motivated the practice.") (emphasis added).
232. See Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 708 (10th Cir. 1988)
(after-acquired evidence relates only to question of "injury," and not to the issue of
liability).
233. See Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 830 F. Supp. 305, 308 (E.D. Va. 1993) ("[N]o
distinction exists between liability and remedy when no relief is available because of after-
acquired evidence .... ").
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such evidence will affect only the nature and scope of the plaintiff's
potential remedies, but the evidence cannot influence the initial ques-
tion of whether liability exists. An employer's liability will always re-
main in issue regardless of any subsequent evidence of employee
misconduct. As a consequence, an employer cannot be granted sum-
mary judgment solely on the basis of after-acquired evidence because
a triable issue will remain as to whether the complaining party indeed
suffered discrimination.3 4
B. Materiality Requirement
Courts should ensure that all after-acquired evidence is material
before permitting it to have any effect on the litigation. The material-
ity inquiry has two parts: First, the employer must objectively demon-
strate that the after-acquired evidence would have justified the
employment decision. Second, the employer must show that it would
indeed have made that. decision had it known of the after-acquired
evidence.3 5 Moreover, because the after-acquired evidence serves as
a "partial affirmative defense" under this approach, the employer
should bear the burden of persuasion on the question of
materiality.P 6
The materiality requirement, if properly administered by the
courts, protects the legitimacy of the defense by ensuring that an em-
ployer could have and would have made the same adverse employ-
234. Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. Civ.
P. 56(c). Because an employer's after-acquired evidence will affect only the quality of the
plaintiff's remedies and not their ultimate availability, summary judgment will never be
appropriate solely on the basis of after-acquired evidence. This approach does not fore-
close summary judgment on other grounds (e.g., when the plaintiff cannot make out a
prima facie case of discrimination), or partial summary judgment on the plaintiff's claims
for prospective remedies such as front pay, reinstatement, or promotion. See infra text
accompanying notes 235-42.
235. See O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 12 F.3d 176 (10th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 62
U.S.L.W. 3757 (U.S. Apr. 1, 1994) (No. 93-1728). This second prong of the materiality
requirement is a purely subjective test, focusing on how a specific employer would react in
this hypothetical scenario. See Brief for Respondent at 18, McKennon v. Nashville Banner
Publishing Co., No. 93-1543 (U.S. Sept. 8, 1994) (arguing that one aspect of materiality is
that "the employer must prove subjectively that it would have terminated the employee
had the misconduct been discovered").
236. Cf. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 246 (1989) (observing that a
mixed-motive argument is most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense because "the
plaintiff must persuade the factfinder on one point, and then the employer, if it wishes to
prevail, must persuade it on another."). See also Follette, supra note 12, at 669 (arguing
that the burden of proof rests with defendant to show the materiality of after-acquired
evidence once plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of discrimination).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
ment decision.237 Consistent with the minority approach, it prevents
an employer "from combing a discharged employee's record for evi-
dence of any and all misrepresentations, no matter how minor or triv-
ial, in an effort to avoid legal responsibility for an otherwise
impermissible discharge. '238 Additionally, because summary judg-
ment will no longer be appropriate on the question of liability, the
factual question of materiality must be determined not on the basis of
self-serving affidavits, but by a properly instructed jury.239
C. Prospective Remedies and Back Pay
Consistent with both the majority and minority views, a plaintiff's
prospective remedies of reinstatement, promotion, or front pay should
be precluded where the employer is able to proffer material evidence
of the plaintiffs misconduct.2 40 If an employer's after-acquired evi-
dence provides a legitimate motive for termination, an award of rein-
statement or front pay would go beyond the remedial purpose of the
statute and "would unduly trammel [an employer's] freedom to law-
fully discharge employees."' 241 Because Title VII does not limit the
other permissible "qualities and characteristics that employers may
take into account in making employment decisions," 242 the statute's
explicit protections would be exceeded if courts were to grant pro-
spective relief to employees who would nevertheless have been termi-
nated in light of their misconduct.
Unlike the minority approach, plaintiffs should not receive a back
pay award if an employer submits material evidence of the plaintiffs
fraud or misconduct, whether or not the evidence was discovered af-
ter-the-fact. Eliminating the back pay award is necessary to prevent
dishonest employees from obtaining a litigation windfall. Moreover,
because the employee was not actually entitled to the job at the mo-
ment the adverse employment decision was made, a back pay award
237. See Reed v. AMAX Coal Co., 971 F.2d 1295, 1298 (7th Cir. 1992). In its brief to
the Supreme Court in Nashville Banner, the employer argued that this type of test would
comport with the objective and subjective standards of proof required in sexual harassment
cases by Harris v. Forklift Sys., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993). Brief for Respondent at 18 n.28,
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., No. 93-1543 (U.S. Sept. 8, 1994).
238. Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 1992).
239. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 gives plaintiffs in Title VII actions the right to a jury
trial. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (Supp. III 1991). This provision applies to all cases that arose
after the effective date of the statute. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483
(1994) (holding that the 1991 Act does not apply retroactively).
240. See, e.g., Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1181 (11th Cir. 1992) (hold-
ing that reinstatement and front pay are inappropriate remedies in light of material after-
acquired evidence), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, No. 91-7406, 1994 WL 481439 (11th
Cir. Sept. 6, 1994).
241. Id. at 1182.
242. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989).
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goes beyond the "make whole" purpose of Title VII and actually
places the employee in a better position. A back pay award is
designed to place the employee in the same position he or she would
have occupied but for the illegal discrimination.243 Thus, to the extent
that the employee's pre-discrimination position was either attained or
preserved through illicit means, it makes little sense to return the em-
ployee to the status quo ante by awarding back pay. That the em-
ployee's misdeeds would not have been discovered but for the
employer's alleged discrimination should not matter, provided both
that the employer is punished for its discriminatory practices and that
the employee is compensated for the actual discrimination suffered.244
D. Redressing Discrimination
Although a back pay award in after-acquired evidence cases
would go beyond the remedial purpose of Title VII, an employee who
proves discrimination should be entitled to a remedy for the harm
caused by the employer's illegal conduct. Because it seeks to balance
similar competing interests, section 107(b) of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 provides a valuable starting point for determining a plaintiff's
remedy in this situation.245 However, because section 107(b)'s reme-
dial framework does not go far enough in providing adequate redress
for the harm caused by discrimination, it does not represent the per-
fect model.
Importantly, section 107(b) does not allow for recovery of com-
pensatory or punitive damages to mixed-motive plaintiffs.246 Because
these remedies are necessary to make a victim of discrimination
"whole," they are an integral part of the revised Title VII framework
243. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-19 (1975).
244. This is consistent with the Supreme Court's pronouncement that "backpay should
be denied only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central statu-
tory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons
whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination." Abermarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405,421 (1975). As noted in Part IV.D., infra, an employee will be "made whole"
by an award of compensatory and, if appropriate, punitive damages for the discrimination
suffered. The availability of these awards (and reasonable attorney's fees) will also serve
to deter employers from discriminatory employment practices.
245. Section 107(b) provides that when an individual makes out a prima facie case of
discrimination and the employer demonstrates that it would have taken the same action in
the absence of the impermissible motivating factor:
[Tihe court- (i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief.., and attorney's
fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a
claim under section [107(a)]; and (ii) shall not award damages or issue an order
requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment, described
in subparagraph (A).
§ 107(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (Supp. III
1991)).
246. See id.
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and should not be denied arbitrarily to particular plaintiffs, so long as
discriminatory conduct is proven.247 However, because "a com-
plaining party [may] receive relief only for the harm that actually re-
sults from the illegal discriminatory conduct,"248 section 107(b) is
correct in precluding an award of back pay to successful plaintiffs in
mixed-motive cases. It is also correct in authorizing courts to grant
other appropriate relief, including declaratory and injunctive relief, as
well as attorney's fees and costs. 249
The remedial framework found in section 107(b), combined with
a provision for compensatory and punitive damages, is an appropriate
solution to the problem of after-acquired evidence. This approach
would take into consideration the misdeeds of the employee, and it
would ensure that victims of discrimination obtain redress only for the
injury actually attributable to the discrimination. °50 Specifically, a
remedy would be provided to compensate for the discriminatory con-
duct of employers, yet employees who defraud their employers would
be prevented from obtaining an undeserved windfall.
The availability of compensatory and punitive damages in after-
acquired evidence cases is essential in order to attain the deterrent
and remedial goals of Title VII.251 Although back pay should be de-
nied for the simple reason that it represents economic compensation
for a job to which the employee was not entitled, compensatory and
punitive damages specifically focus on the discrimination suffered and
should be available to plaintiffs who prove employer liability. As
mentioned, the 1991 Act provides these discrimination-related reme-
dies in disparate treatment cases that do not involve mixed motives. 252
A victorious plaintiff may now be awarded compensatory damages for
247. See Belton, supra note 21, at 943 (arguing that the denial of compensatory and
punitive damages undercuts the dual objectives of Title VII).
248. H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., tit. II, at 19 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 712 (emphasis added).
249. § 107(b), 105 Stat. at 1075-76 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (Supp. III
1991)).
250. This enforcement scheme is also consistent with the second of Title VII's dual
objectives - deterring employers from engaging in discriminatory employment practices.
In the mixed-motive context, Congress determined that employers would be sufficiently
deterred by the prospect of costly litigation, a possible injunction, and the ignominy of
being branded as an employer that discriminates against its employees. If this deterrent
function is realized in the mixed-motive context, in which the employer has contemporane-
ous knowledge of both permissible and impermissible reasons to discharge the employee,
then it should function at least as well in the after-acquired evidence context, in which the
employer does not know until much later of a legitimate reason for discharging the
employee.
251. To deny such relief to a plaintiff who is able to prove liability would, in the words
of one commentator, give the plaintiff "at best, a pyrrhic victory." Belton supra, note 21, at
943.
252. See supra note 21.
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the pain and suffering, inconvenience, and mental anguish that result
from an employer's intentional discrimination.2 3 These specific inju-
ries result directly from an employer's discriminatory conduct and are
separate and distinct from the economic injury ordinarily caused by
the loss of a job or promotion.254 Consequently, these injuries are not
in any way mitigated by the employer's subsequent discovery of the
plaintiff's misconduct and damages should not, therefore, be pre-
cluded if otherwise deserved255 Similarly, the availability of a puni-
tive damage award should not be determined according to the
complaining employee's conduct: Because such an award is designed
to punish and deter, courts must look exclusively to the acts of the
employer. An award of punitive damages is proper under Title VII
when an employer engages in a discriminatory practice "with malice
or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an
aggrieved individual."'256 This standard is unaffected by the subse-
quent discovery of the employee's own misconduct. Thus, when an
employer's intentional discrimination rises to the level of "malice" or
"reckless indifference," punitive damages should be awarded without
regard to the employer's after-acquired evidence. 5 7
Conclusion
The federal courts' conflicting treatment of after-acquired evi-
dence in disparate treatment cases stems from the inability of these
courts to balance the countervailing interests at stake. In their
steadfast application of the inflexible Summers rule, the majority of
courts cut off even.potentially meritorious claims and thereby under-
mine the important objectives of the antidiscrimination statutes. By
contrast, courts in the minority go too far in effectuating these goals
253. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. III 1991).
254. One court described the non-economic injury which results from discrimination as
"more than the loss of just a wage. It means the loss of a sense of achievement and the loss
of a chance to learn. Discrimination is a vicious act. It may destroy hope and any trace of
self-respect. That, and not the loss of pay, is perhaps the injury which is felt the most and
the one which is the greatest." Humphrey v. Southwestern Portland Cement Co., 369 F.
Supp. 832, 834 (W.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 488 F.2d 691 (5th. Cir. 1974)
(finding error in district court's finding of facts).
255. See Zemelman, supra note 103, at 208 (compensatory damages "counteract harms
that do not decrease simply because the victim misrepresented credentials or engaged in
other misconduct.").
256. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (Supp. IH 1991).
257. The EEOC enforcement guidance issued July 14, 1992 is in accord with this no-
tion. "[I]f the employer's sole motivation was discriminatory and it acted with 'malice or
with reckless indifference' to the victim's rights, proof of an after-the-fact justification
would not shield an employer from an order requiring it to pay punitive damages." Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Revised Enforcement Guidance No.915-002, 1992 WL
189088, at *9 (July 14, 1992).
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- their approach transcends the remedial purpose of Title VII by
providing a windfall to employees who have no legal entitlement to
their positions of employment.
A more balanced approach to the after-acquired evidence prob-
lem evaluates the underlying policy of Title VII in light of the em-
ployer's right to insist upon integrity in the work force and the
equitable notion that a deceitful employee should not receive a wind-
fall. The courts should therefore adopt an approach that provides a
remedy for the discrimination suffered by an individual, but that does
not confer an undeserved bounty for the loss of a job to which the
individual had no legal right. Such an approach will place the com-
plaining individuals in the same positions they would have occupied
but for the illegal discrimination, but it will also guard against placing
these individuals in a better position. This equilibrium can be attained
by precluding the job-related economic relief available to a Title VII
plaintiff, yet still awarding the forms of relief that are inexorably
linked to the injuries which flow from discrimination - namely, de-
claratory relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and an award of
attorney's fees for the pursuit of the claim. This proposed approach
will ensure that the effect of an employee's dishonesty is not over-
looked or trivialized. At the same time, however, it upholds the policy
behind Title VII by recognizing that an employee who is subjected to
a discriminatory employment practice has indeed suffered an injury
regardless of whether other legitimate reasons for the employer's con-
duct might have existed.
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